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Abstract
This article interrogates the bureaucratization of war, incarnate in the covert lethal drone.
Bureaucracies are criticized typically for their complexity, inefficiency, and inflexibility. This article
is concerned with their moral indifference. It explores killing, which is so highly administered,
so morally remote, and of such scale, that we acknowledge a covert lethal program. This is a
bureaucratized program of assassination in contravention of critical human rights. In this article, this
program is seen to compromise the advance of global justice. Moreover, the bureaucratization of
lethal force is seen to dissolve democratic ideals from within. The bureaucracy isolates the citizens
from lethal force applied in their name. People are killed, in the name of the State, but without
conspicuous justification, or judicial review, and without informed public debate. This article gives
an account of the risk associated with the bureaucratization of the State’s lethal power. Exemplified
by the covert drone, this is power with formidable reach. It is power as well, which requires great
moral sensitivity. Considering the drone program, this article identifies challenges, which will
become more prominent and pressing, as technology advances.
Keywords: bureaucracy; covert lethal drones; Central Intelligence Agency; democracy;
terrorism; war
This article considers some of the moral problems which follow from bureau-
cratization of the State’s lethal power. Speaking of bureaucratization, it identifies
operations embedded in the secretive agencies and undeclared bureaus of the
political administration. These operations, though highly administered, are seen
to be insufficiently attentive to moral ideas. The covert lethal drone program
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exemplifies such operations, and points to moral challenges that will only become
more prominent, pressing and complex with the advance and proliferation of
technology.
Speaking at the National Defense University at Fort McNair on Thursday, May
23, 2013, President Obama acknowledged covert drone operations outside declared
war zones. The President acknowledged civilian deaths; the inevitable entailment of
covert strikes. And, though the President spoke of a diminished terrorist threat, he
made it clear that the covert lethal drone program would remain intact.
Flown typically by civilians of the Central Intelligence Agency, covert lethal drone
operations are seen to yield strategic advantage at negligible cost. Unlike the Special
Forces soldiers, who would otherwise carry out targeted killing, the civilians who
fly secret robotic missions bear no evident physical risk. Their victims are ambushed,
innominate screen images who cannot fight back. The bureaucracy deploys the drone
to kill, without seeming consequence. But, there is significant moral risk and cost.
The employment of covert lethal drones by the United States was pragmatic,
a comprehensible case of post September 11 dirty hands. The continuation of
these operations appears less vindicable. The United States must now set the security
offered by covert drones, against the critical human freedoms they efface. The
balance struck will define the justice the United States and her allies might hope
to uphold and advance. For this reason, policy concerning covert lethal drone
operations concerns all nations.1
Exploring the operation of covert lethal drones, this article looks past questions
concerning military action or international law, which have been characteristic of
public debate. Analysis does not concern the jus in bello challenges of military drones.
Neither is the focus of discussion on the problem of covert political assassination,
which in the aftermath of terrorist attacks on the Pentagon and the World Trade
Center, has a new allure and complexity. Rather, this article confines its attention
to problems entailing from the bureaucratization of lethal force. Discussion is not
about selective or occasional political assassination; specific murders, which might
be justified when a single homicide avoids wholesale war. This analysis is about the
bureaucratization of covert killing, political execution, killing which has become so
highly administered and organized, so impersonal and morally remote, and of such a
scale, that we acknowledge a covert lethal drone program. The idea of a program is
significant, since it references a schedule, a pattern of killing reduced by ‘the system’
to hum-drum routine, and exemplified by:
A New York Times report (which) showed a president who had weekly meetings with
his advisors on ‘Terror Tuesdays’ to look at profiles of terror suspects much as one
would flip through baseball cards, and ‘nominate’ people (the article says, ‘without
hand wringing’) to be on a kill list.2
This article peers behind the fac¸ade and gloss of political respectability, and behind
the routine of schedules and systems. It explores the democracy’s use of force as a
consequential expression of democracy. Killing by covert drone is killing in the name
of the State. But, immersed in the secret bureaucracy, lethal power is without moral
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sensitivity. This discussion observes how, concealed by officialdom, killing by covert
drone is killing without justification, without judicial oversight, and without the
informed public debate, which is critical to the collective democratic conscience.
This article seeks to inform the perspective of all of us who are isolated by the
political bureaucracy from the deadly force applied, outside the framework of law3
in our name. It does not address remote and abstract philosopher’s questions,
but rather asks questions which must be answered, if democracies are to exert
constructive influence as the agents of global justice.
THE BUREAUCRATIZATION OF WAR
Speaking of bureaucratization, this article identifies operations entrenched in
the political establishment. These operations are purposeful, scheduled, and highly
organized; yet they are insufficiently attentive to moral ideas. Covert lethal drone
operations exemplify such operations.
Covert lethal drones epitomize the evolution of State-sanctioned lethal force.
Conspicuously, drone missions have changed the face of warfare. Less evidently,
covert lethal drones threaten the democracy they are supposed to defend, and the
ideals they are supposed to protect. Hidden from scrutiny by the mechanisms of official
secrecy and dissimulated by bureaucratic routine, the drone menace is misjudged.
Concealed by technology’s veneer and bureaucracy’s methodical order, sub
rosa drone strikes appear clinical. Together, ingenious instrument and bureaucratic
mechanism cast an anodyne camouflage over deathly force. Programmed and
scheduled: technology conforms to bureaucratic habit. The bureaucracy plans,
forecasts, orders events and measures results. Killing becomes less intensely human
and less patently moral.
The covert drone exemplifies the attenuation of moral reasoning when schemes
become programs, and programs routine. The covert drone illuminates the moral
lacuna that divides standard operating procedures from individual decision and
discernment. The drone highlights the dehumanizing attention, which is paid to
detailed metrics such as cost or technological effectiveness. This is what happens
when civilian contractors or non-commissioned and non-elected officials manage
departments and the process of killing on behalf of the State. Bureaucracies are often
criticized for their complexity, their inefficiency, and their inflexibility. This article is
most concerned with the bureaucracy’s indifference and moral unconcern.
In The Trial, Kafka captures bureaucracy’s insupportable moral unresponsiveness.
Kafka reveals the hallmarks of bureaucracy at its worst: remote and unapproachable,
cold-blooded and unstoppable. In a telling passage, Kafka criticizes the secrecy and
concealment, which is ‘an essential part of the justice dispensed here that you should
be condemned not only in innocence but also in ignorance’.4 Unfolding the futility of
human resistance, Kafka apprehends bureaucracy as an unsafe reason and a poor
excuse. Dirty hands are not cleaned merely because evil conformed to bureaucratic
convention.
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Speaking at the National Defense University, President Obama acknowledged the
lethal reach of drone technology. And, though President Obama claimed the drone
program conformed to the highest standards, political practice does not dispel doubt.
Observing the moral jobbery of contemporary public life, Thomas Pogge wrote:
Moral language is all around us*praising and condemning as good or evil, right or
wrong, just or unjust, virtuous or vicious. In all too many cases, however, such
language is used only to advance personal or group interests.5
Pogge draws attention to play politics where moral language is a cover for wrongdoing,
cunning ad realist convenience. At the same time, he sheds light on the moral frailty
of the covert lethal drone program. By its nature, such a program is bureaucratic.
The program is deep-rooted within the established structures and procedures of
government, judged by quantitative metrics and invisible to public scrutiny. Nowhere
does the covert drone program call upon personal rectitude, which Pogge points out is
merely occasional in public life. Immersed in the establishment, the covert drone
exemplifies lethal power without moral sensitivity.
THE COVERT DRONE PROGRAM
Before Al Qaeda’s attack on New York and Washington, the United States
denounced Israel’s targeted killing of Palestinian terrorists. The US Ambassador
to Israel, Martin Indyk, said ‘The United States government is very clearly on record
as against targeted assassinations’, which he described as ‘extrajudicial killing’.6 This
posture changed dramatically following the September 2001 terrorist attacks. Since
this time, State-sponsored assassination, described euphemistically as targeted killing,
had become an official US policy.7
Implemented through the Predator and Reaper drone platforms, the strategy of
covert targeted killing uses private contractors for various tasks, including flying the
drones. This targeted bureaucratized program (identified in this article as the covert
lethal drone program) runs in parallel to drone missions flown by the US military
(identified in this article as military drones). But, though technically similar, the
two programs are philosophically different. Military personnel fly military drones, in
declared war zones against recognized military objectives. Military drones are a
mechanism of conventional war, not materially different from any weapons system
where lethal force is applied with precision from an extended range. As a stand-off
weapons system, drones are necessary since, as Hans Morgenthau said, in some cases
we deem it necessary to fight.8 But more particularly, military drones enable a certain
mode of fighting. We seek precision weapons*like military drones*because we wish
to fight with exactitude and thus reduce risk to non-combatants. We seek weapons
of extended range*also like military drones*so as to safeguard the soldiers who
defend our societies. Military drones then are not remarkably different from any
other weapons system operated by uniformed personnel in declared war zones.
The bureaucratic program of remote controlled assassination is quite a separate
thing. Operated covertly by the Central Intelligence Agency against suspected
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terrorists, and beyond the boundaries of declared war zones, the program was initiated
by the Bush Administration and has since been expanded under President Obama.9
Hidden away in the corridors of political power, this program has become habit, a
custom. As bureaucracy’s rococo routine conceals the moral gravity of decisions;
within the labyrinth, people become insufficiently attentive to the decisions they make.
DRONES, BUREAUCRACY, AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY
Drone operations are not, of and in themselves, unethical. But drone operations are
ensnared in bureaucracy, and the bureaucratization of killing is problematic. Entwined
in officialdom; the lethal power of the State is ungoverned by foundational moral ideas.
And, with their moral acumen tranquilized by the bureaucracy’s procedural regimen,
individuals exercise the State’s lethal force without compassion or compunction.
Bureaucrats reduce blood shedding to a routine. When these people pass verdicts of
life and death, the potential for abuse and overreach is beyond calculation.
This section considers the decisions to kill, which are made by people immersed in
the political bureaucracy and isolated from the point-blank moral intensity of battle.
For them, exercising the State’s lethal power has become unproblematic and devoid
of moral concern. Their victims are dehumanized by a ‘political label’ as ‘terrorists’10
and executed by remote control. Yet, though mechanized and impersonal*killing by
drone is still killing, and it must not be immoral or without moral concern.
In Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands, the philosopher Michael Walzer
acknowledges utilitarian imperatives. Arguing that ‘it is easy to get one’s hands dirty
in politics and it is often right to do so’,11 Walzer describes the political dilemma of
moral people confronted by utilitarian pressure. When deeply held moral convictions
are confronted by circumstances, Walzer argues that good people will typically accept
the utilitarian calculation and try to measure up. Faced with extremity, Walzer argues
that in order to do the right thing, good people will commit a moral wrong. The
innocent will not remain innocent should they choose to abide by absolute moral
principles because, says Walzer, they will fail to measure up.12
Confronted by stakes of a significant magnitude, Walzer argues it is right to get
one’s hands dirty.13 But it is not right, Walzer reasons, to dirty one’s hands with
neither qualm nor moral second thought.14 His position is pragmatic and prudential.
But Walzer is not callous; he is not unrealistically realist, blind to critical human
rights and dignities. The argument Walzer makes enables us to see how people who
act against deeply held moral convictions might feel distress, or even guilt, whilst
not actually being guilty. Walzer illuminates the moral challenge faced by those who
find themselves confronted by dilemma, and forced to ‘weigh the wrong (they)
are willing to do in order to do right’.15 Spelling out the problem of dirty hands,
Walzer identifies a moral awareness and insight, which is not conspicuous amidst the
pressures of politically realist bureaucracy.
Walzer argues that when the consequences of not acting are ‘beyond calculation,
immeasurably awful . . . (amounting to) evil objectified in the world . . . a threat to
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human values so radical that its imminence would surely constitute a supreme
emergency’16 then deep moral convictions must be overridden in the pursuit of a
greater good. But Walzer does not suggest that no attention should be paid either to
justice or injustice, to kindness or cruelty. Walzer does not believe that good effects
inevitably justify reprehensible action.
Walzer acknowledges moral standards, which might be overridden in only in-
describably grave circumstances. Walzer advocates the sacrifice of personal goodness,
only when there is no other course of action. He allows the mindful, conscious and
presumably regretted sacrifice of personal ideals, and argues against the careless
wanton abandonment of moral standards.17 Richly textured and nuanced, Walzer’s
argument advances powerful claims against the sort of moral insensitivity, which is
typical of large-scale bureaucracy. In his text, Criminal Case 40/61: The Trial of Adolf
Eichmann, Harry Mulisch offers an influential and profound illustration of the evil
which follows from morally heedless bureaucratic compliance.
Enumerating the war crimes of Adolf Eichmann, Mulisch explains how ‘a
dull group of godforsaken civil servants doing their godforsaken duty’18 turned the
bureaucracy into a weapon. Describing an insensitive, process-driven administration,
Mulisch coined the term ‘psycho-technology’.19 The term speaks to a quintessen-
tially bureaucratic engrossment with obedience, and to the culpable moral torpor
that pervades bureaucratic habit. Eichmann did not get his hands dirty in the
way Walzer conceives, because Eichmann was morally oblivious. Insufficiently
attentive to moral ideas, Eichmann was tranquilized by bureaucracy’s regimen.
Similar to bureaucrats everywhere, Eichmann exercised the State’s lethal force
without compassion or concern, and with a clear conscience.
In her compelling investigation; Eichmann in Jerusalem, Hannah Arendt describes
how Eichmann, seduced by the Third Reich, was ‘not Iago and not Macbeth, and
nothing would have been further from his mind than to determine with Richard
III ‘‘to prove a villain’’’.20 Submissive to the bureaucracy, Eichmann’s evil was
monstrous. But more significantly it was, in Arendt’s famous term, banal. Eichmann
was predictable and conventional: his compliance was ordinary and commonplace.
‘He merely, to put the matter colloquially, merely never realized what he was doing’.21
When on trial, Eichmann was described unsurprisingly by his defence as ‘only
a ‘‘tiny cog’’ in the machinery of the Final Solution (and) in its judgement the
court naturally conceded that such a crime could be committed only by a giant
bureaucracy’.22
Acknowledging the suffusive authority of bureaucracy, the court understood what
Foucault called the ‘subtle, calculated technology of subjugation . . . the separation,
coordination and supervision of tasks (which) constitutes an operational schema of
power’.23 This was ‘panopticism’, designed ‘to ensure the prompt obedience of the
people and the most absolute authority of the magistrates . . .’24 which MacIntyre
understood to depend for its success upon disguise and concealment.25 Applied
through an insidious ensemble of technical interventions, bureaucratic influence
commodifies people and dissolves moral autonomy. In bureaucracy, people are
valued when their character is inclined toward rule-following.
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But Arendt recognizes that bureaucracy does not excuse individuals from moral
responsibility. Arendt presumes ideas of virtue ought inform interpretation of laws
and regulations. Her analysis reveals how moral thinking is much more than the
licit compliance, which is valued in bureaucratic systems. Eichmann’s merciless
obedience makes clear the limitations of ‘the simple principles of the deontologist’,
which R. M. Hare acknowledged to be a ‘prime concern of churches and other
‘‘moral authorities’’’.26 Depicting Eichmann’s moral failure, Arendt underlines
Walzer’s reasoning that political action should be informed by scruple and moral
discernment.27 Her account of Eichmann’s moral inanity is shocking. The implica-
tion for the contemporary program of CIA murder is appalling. The CIA has secured
the background conditions, which make systematized murder by the State seem
unremarkable and banal.
In an authoritative investigative text, The Way of the Knife, Mark Mazzetti
explores the CIA covert drone program. Recalling Eichmann’s grotesque delin-
quency, Mazzetti describes political murder committed without discernment or
remorse. Citing Richard Blee, formerly head of the CIA unit tasked with finding
Osama bin Laden, Mazzetti describes how selective covert strikes came to be morally
vacuous matters of routine. As bureaucratic habit overwhelmed ethical sensitivity,
lethal force came to be abused and permission to launch lethal strikes in Pakistan was
given, even when American spies were not certain whom they were killing.28 Reliant
on notoriously inexact intelligence,29 these so-called signature strikes often resulted
in high proportions of non-combatant causalities. Mazzetti quotes Blee:
In the early days, for our consciences we wanted to know who we were killing before
anyone pulled the trigger, now we’re lighting these people up all over the place.30
Mazzetti reveals how, greased by bureaucratic routine, ‘the pistons of the killing
machine operate entirely without friction’.31 Immersed in the political bureaucracy,
people exercise the State’s lethal power without qualm, and without a mind to
democratic ideals. And critically, as Mazzetti acknowledges, the frictionless bureau-
cratic mechanism dissolves the fabric of public democracy.32
DRONES, BUREAUCRACY, AND PUBLIC DEMOCRACY
In The New Yorker, Jane Mayer cites Mary Dudziak, a professor at the University of
Southern California’s Gould School of Law, who argues ‘drones are a technological
step that further isolates the American people from military action, undermining
political checks on . . . endless war’.33 Michael Walzer is similarly disturbed that a
civilian intelligence agency wields the State’s lethal power in secret.34 Walzer’s
concern is that people are killed in the name of the United States*and in the name
of nations allied to the United States*without any public justification.
Philip Alston, UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary
executions, tacks a parallel tack. In a study on targeted killings, submitted to
the United Nations Human Rights Council on 28 May 2010, he criticized ‘the
displacement of clear legal standards with a vaguely defined licence to kill, and the
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creation of a major accountability vacuum’.35 Alston explained how the legitimate
struggle against terrorism has been compromised by a proliferation of wicked acts,
routinely explained away by the bureaucratic gloss of legal language, and he protested
the failure of governments to:
Specify the legal justification for policies, to disclose the safeguards in place to
ensure that targeted killings are in fact legal and accurate, or to provide
accountability mechanisms for violations.36
The bureaucratization of drone warfare involves a hefty price, particularly in the
corrosion of public democracy. People are isolated by the bureaucracy, from war and
from the horrors done in their name. Equally, government agencies are protected by
bureaucratic obfuscation and escape the reckoning of public accountability. As
William Felice observes, within bureaucracy it is:
Often difficult to attribute moral responsibility to anyone . . . (and where) there is a
tendency to deny the responsibility of an individual person, instead attributing
blame abstractly to ‘the system,’ the government, or, ‘the State’.37
Political bureaucracy, as Felice depicts it, is a large-scale feature of the contemporary
world. Such bureaucracy structures human interaction, and presumes a moral theory
in the modes of action and interaction, which it enjoins. Of foundational concern, is
the presumption that citizens are rightly disarticulated from political decision; that
citizens are merely ruled and no better than indifferent spectators.
C. Wright Mills observed the disenfranchisement that impairs the modern
and largely urban bureaucracy. Describing the way that the political bureaucracy
manipulates the community, Mills described how ‘there is the propagandist, the
publicity expert, the public-relations man, who would control the very formation
of public opinion in order to be able to include it as one more pacified item in
calculations of effective power’.38 He argued that:
The communications which prevail are so organized that it is difficult or impossible
for the individual to answer back immediately or with any effect. The realisation of
opinion in action is controlled by authorities who organize and control the channel
of such action.39
Mills critiques a mode of bureaucratic functioning, which presumes citizens are
content to experience political events at an unworried and indifferent distance. He
identifies the spin and concoction, which operates to put a cordon sanitaire around
politics. The people are kept at a safe distance, their engagement in politics regulated
by the apparatus and ordinance of the press office. Part of this is political stagecraft,
the rehearsed rhetoric that has been a part of democratic life since the Pnyx. But
there is a part that is not so innocuous: a part that bowdlerizes public statements and
keeps the people silent.
Citizens, of course, do not declare war. They may be able to veto military
operations at the ballot box, though usually only after a declared conflict has exacted a
terrific cost. Even so, in modern mass democracies, the consent of the people remains
a critical condition of war’s legitimacy. Such consent will, of course, be influenced by
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propaganda and bellicose patriotism as much as by a commitment to the high
ideals of justice. But at a critical level, public consent for war depends upon
the manifest and meaningful accountability of legitimate authority. The drone
campaign, which is concealed by political bureaucracy, fails to meet any standard
of accountability.
A different concern about covert drone killings, acknowledges democracy’s use
of force as a consequential expression of democracy. A democracy should be very
mindful of the force it uses at home, and abroad. Speaking against the death penalty,
Cesare Beccaria argued in his 1764 Essay on Crimes and Punishments, the State ought
only go so far. He argued that the State’s obligation to maintain order does not
mean the State has license to do whatever it wants. The protection of public security
does justify some measure of imposition, but ‘every act of authority of one man
over another for which there is not an absolute necessity, is tyrannical’.40 Thus
the smallest encroachment beyond that which is strictly necessary is ‘abuse, not
justice’.41 Thus, a democratic people will not accept that the State has the power to
use force against them in secret, without any measure of accountability. Similarly, a
democracy should be circumspect in its use of force abroad.42
But the covert drone program contravenes critical human rights and democratic
ideals, and dissipates the integrity of democratic justice. Covert drone strikes are not
flown by military personnel in declared war zones. Covert missions do not target
identified military targets. Covert drone strikes are mounted against those who are
merely presumed to be terrorists; against those who merely look like terrorists, who
fit a profile*in the argot of CIA covert strikes*a signature. The risks are very great.
Since covert operations began in Pakistan in 2004, one estimate is that 780 civilians,
including 175 children, have been casualties.43
Sustaining a covert drone program therefore erodes the capacity of a democratic
nation to advance global justice. As a program, covert drone operations are highly
structured and of such a scale that they have become bureaucratized. The
inescapable corollary is that decisions to kill are not like the decision soldiers may
make to kill an adversary. The drone program makes killing impersonal, a matter of
routine. Killing is less intensely and less patently a moral judgment.
The Einsatzgruppen and the crematoria gave pitiless and repugnant expression
to the minutes and decisions of political staff, of meetings and committees. Just
so, covert drones give lethal effect to the recommendations and determinations of
bureaucrats who define the official criteria of signature targets.
THE DANGEROUS CONVENIENCE OF DRONES
Concealed behind the muddiness of bureaucratic language and routine, covert drone
killing seems merely expedient and not at all upsetting or shocking. Targets are
serviced: problems are solved. On the face of it, justice is served. But without the
conscientious and purposeful commitment of the polity, killing is less an act of just
war than low murder. Enabled by the bureaucracy and disconnected from the social
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conscience, drone killing is effortless*but it is not bloodless, and not without moral
significance.
In Perpetual Peace, Kant argued powerfully that the democratic state should be less
likely to go to war because:
If, as must be so under (the republican or democratic) constitution, the consent of
the subjects is required to determine whether there shall be war or not, nothing is
more natural than that they should weigh the matter well, before undertaking such
bad business. For in decreeing war, they would of necessity be resolving to bring
down the miseries of war upon the country. This implies: they must fight
themselves; they must hand over the costs of the war out of their own property;
they must do their poor best to make good the devastation which it leaves behind;
and finally, as a crowning ill, they have to accept a burden of debt which will
embitter even peace itself.44
Kant understands that democratic citizens, realizing the price to be paid in blood and
treasure, will deliberate the necessity of conflict seriously. But, disguised and glossed
by the political bureaucracy, covert drone killing seems costless and without moral
risk. The citizens are misinformed; they cannot give fully formed consent to the
killing committed in their name.
The dissimulation of bureaucratic language is aided and abetted by drone
technology. Pioneering technology informs the rhetorical devices which aim to reduce
political and societal inhibitions to conflict. Drones are described as ‘unmanned’,
‘robotic’, and ‘remote’. Technological ideas are applied with practiced artifice to
amplify the psychological distance, which separates advanced democratic society from
the distant impact of Hellfire missiles. Technological language dissolves the human
empathy, which should inform the moral calculus of war.
The misappropriation of technical language may bring about more than con-
cern about deceit. Technology, which enables the political bureaucracy to depict
drone strikes as clinical, routine, regulated and efficient, may contribute to a public
callousness, to a public susceptible to the idea of costless war, and to a public
predisposed to tolerate wars waged by the bureaucratic class. In his book, Wired for
War, political scientist P. W. Singer writes, ‘unmanned systems represent the ultimate
break between the public and its military’.45 Singer recognizes that a weapons system
can shape the viability of military action. But more importantly, he illuminates the
way that technology can erode our controlling humanity and moral insight. From this
perspective, he informs the debate about the dehumanizing bureaucratization of war,
which may make war more likely.
DRONES, BUREAUCRACY, AND THE MEANING OF WAR
Vesting the secret bureaucracy with lethal power has transformed the idea of war.
Traditionally trusted and commissioned by the State as custodians of lethal power,
the military has been supplanted unwisely. Waged covertly by the bureaucracy, war
has become remote and killing sneaky. Society ought to remember the critical role of
honorable soldiers.
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When Thucydides relates how the Corinthians sneered at the Athenian use
of mercenary soldiers,46 he reveals the inter-relationship of soldiers and the State,
which is foundational to the western military tradition. Thucydides understands how
martial ideals embody*or should embody*the aspirations of society. Disparaging
the Athenian mercenaries, Thucydides reveals the deep-set roots of our under-
standing that war is an act of national sacrifice.
Covert drones exaggerate the moral distance, which separates civilians from the
reality of killing done in their name. The lethal bureaucracy reduces war to outright
industrial carnage. Without sacrifice, lacking chivalry, bravery and moral discern-
ment, war becomes a merely legaltechnical term, which is applied to excuse political
butchery.
This is a dangerous turn of events because more than a legal construct, war is a
moral endeavor. ‘For as long as men and women have talked about war, they have
talked about it in terms of right and wrong’.47 War*more than a physical fight or
base slaughter*is a moral concept, richly and powerfully informed by ideals which
societies recognize as critically important. These ideas are not conspicuous in the
narrative of drone warfare and secret agencies.
Once high ideals are sacrificed to pragmatism, the war is lost. Often tacit, the
power and credence of the appeal to high-mindedness is made explicit in United
States Army and Marine Corps counterinsurgency doctrine, which argues ‘lose
moral legitimacy, lose the war’.48
This is a critical idea. In The Trojan Women (415 B.C.), Euripides demonstrates the
significance and complexity of the moral thinking which textures the profession of
arms. Following the capitulation and slaughter of Melos, and butchery at Plataea,
Scione, Hysiae and (almost) Mytilene (where the decree to murder the populace was
rescinded at the last minute) Euripides was heartsick at ‘simple barbarity’.49 When
he has Hecuba exclaim: ‘Achaeans! All your strength is in your spears, not in the
mind’,50 Euripides illustrates the ethical perspective that should distinguish soldiers
from murderers and war from mere butchery. When Euripides has Poseidon curse
the victorious Greeks:
That mortal who sacks fallen cities is a fool,
Who gives the temples and the tombs and hallowed places
Of the dead to desolation. His own turn must come.51
He points out a fundamental truth*war should advance in the cause of a better
peace. Such an end can be accomplished only when conflict is conducted with
chivalry and ethical sensitivity. Without regard for ideals, the drone-wielding realist
bureaucracy will earn resentment and inspire revenge. As Euripides cautions, their
own turn will come.
DRONES ANDA DEMOCRATIC COMMITMENT TO END TERRORISM
The legitimate struggle against terrorism will not, in the end, be won by military
force. Neither will terrorists be defeated by drones of the bureaucracy. Terrorism
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poses a threat, which might best be combated by the law, and by political dialog
and integration. In a 2008 research report, the RAND Corporation found that ‘a
transition to the political process is the most common way in which terrorist groups
(end)’.52 When political integration was not the answer, the RAND report found
policing to be the next most effective strategy for combating terrorism.53 A sustained
commitment to drone operations is not, therefore, a sensible long-term strategy.
The drone is relatively precise weapon, and one that limits the necessity for
military ‘boots on the ground’. But the drone is not the means by which peace will
be won, nor the means by which democracy will be advanced. The implication is
significant, because democratic nations will be judged as much by the company they
keep, as by the means they employ.
DRONES: THEIR FUTURE RESPONSIBLE USE
What is once seen or heard cannot be unseen and unheard. The drone is a
technological advance, which represents a profound and now pervasive challenge
to the western profession of arms, to western democracy, and to the prospects of
global justice. Where the drone leads, other weapons systems will follow. Our moral
thinking must keep up.
The drone is an instrument of the State’s lethal power, which rightly belongs in the
hands of the military. But the governance and regulation of drones must be
transparent. Drone operations should be morally defendable, as well as operationally
practical. Even if the specific details of operations are concealed, the citizens in
whose name violence is practiced should be able to trust that State sanctioned killing
is not furtive murder, and not habituated bureaucratic routine.
As the drawdown from major operations in Afghanistan takes effect, various
lawless frontiers will likely emerge as a new and difficult area of operation. These
will not be the defined battlefields of declared wars. Insurrectionary frontiers will
be the territory of failed or failing States and, conceivably, the incubators of hostile
radicalism. Drones, deployed as part of the post Afghanistan force projection
strategy, will patrol these inexact marches. Such operations, though they may
well be covert, need to be philosophically transparent. Publically accessible rules of
engagement need to define the basis upon which a covert lethal drone strike may be
authorized. Force projection needs to be more than lawful and recognized as just and
responsible.
The drone, though stealthy, needs to emerge from the bureaucracy. Drones must
not be the implements of a bureaucratized murder program. The drone is a military
instrument, materially indistinguishable from airborne munitions, or from cruise
missiles launched from far-flung platforms at sea. As a military apparatus, lethal
drones should be deployed only in declared war zones, by a disclosed military
command chain, subject to publically accessible rules of engagement and governed
by transparent targeting protocols. All the rules and limits, which apply to conflict
and to military systems, should apply to drones.
R. Adams & C. Barrie
256
There may well be cases where targeted political assassination by covert means, is
justifiable. But this issue was not the focus of this article. This discussion argued that
alarm bells should ring when bureaucrats, secure in their shadowy fiefdoms, embark
upon programs of systematized murder by remote control.
CONCLUSION
Covert lethal drone operations exemplify the recasting of State-sanctioned lethal force.
But, beyond their constructive part in operations, drones menace the democracy
they are supposed to defend, and the ideals they are supposed to protect. This article
did not argue against the operation of covert lethal drones per se. The focus of
discussion was on the bureaucratization of lethal drones. It was argued that when killing
is meshed in bureaucratic routine, the State connives at foundational moral ideas. As
a program formalized in government procedures, lethal drone operations are unlike
particular strikes against named individuals. Bureaucratized covert killing is mechan-
ical in character and petrifying in scale.
Lethal drones reduce war to a political pogrom. People are murdered by the State
beyond the bounds of declared war zones, because they fit an undisclosed profile.
The ritual of legalistic language rationalizes killing, but the high ideals of democracy
and justice are irretrievably diminished. And, with every covert strike, the legitimate
struggle against terrorism is compromised.
The drone is precise weapon, and one that limits the requirement for ‘boots
on the ground’. But the drone is not the means by which peace will be won, nor
the means by which justice will be advanced. Though stealthy, the drone needs
to emerge from the bureaucracy. Drones must not be the concealed weapons of
injustice.
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